Chapter #12: Response to Attorney General Stephen Cox's rule change comments

By David Haeg 4/6/26

Alaska Court System April 6, 2026
RE: Rule Comments
rulecomments@akcourts.gov

Response to Attorney General Stephen Cox's rule change comments:

I read: (1) AG Cox's rule change comments; (2) recent Harvard Journal of Law article **"The Original Meaning and Understanding of the Investigative Power of the Grand Jury in the Constitution of Alaska"** - which AG Cox requested; (3) AG Cox's April 2, 2026 Alaska Story letter; (4) Mayor Edna DeVries recent statement **"Critical Information About Alaska's Grand Juries"**; and (5) January 18, 2022 **"Memorandum"** by Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly attorney Sean Kelley.

Excerpts from AG Cox's April 2, 2026 Alaska Story letter

"If you have followed the debate over Alaska's investigative grand jury, you know it has stirred real concern among many Alaskans. Some believe the grand jury is the people's last line of defense against government misconduct. Some believe that line has been obstructed by the government itself—by prosecutors, by judges, or by the court rules themselves. Those views are strongly held. They are not going away.

I know that because this issue was on my desk before I ever took office. Before I was even sworn in, I began receiving meeting requests from Alaskans who wanted to talk about the investigative grand jury. Many of those requests came from people who have spent years studying, writing, and advocating on this issue. They were serious. Persistent. And convinced something fundamental had gone wrong.

I do not take many outside meetings in this job. The Department of Law is large, and I believe it works best when decisions are made at the right level, with the understanding that anything can be elevated when necessary. But I understood the concern and the interest in a fresh take on it.

I needed some objective help so that I could be confident about the original understanding of the provision. So I called in a favor. I reached out to Professor Rick Garnett at Notre Dame Law School. I asked him to take a fresh look at the history and meaning of Alaska's investigative grand jury clause.

That history confirms that the grand jury was understood as an intermediary between the people and the government—a body that could hear concerns of public importance and issue reports, not merely indictments. It also suggests that this reporting function was not originally conceived as something subject to executive screening or prosecutorial discretion.

What Alaskans should know is that my obligation is to the law as it exists. That includes the Constitution and State statutes but it also includes the Alaska Supreme Court's binding interpretation of Alaska law and the rules the Court has promulgated. That is what my oath requires. It does not mean substituting my own reading of the Constitution for the one that governs."

Excerpts from Spring 2026 Harvard Journal of Law: The Original Meaning and Understanding of the Investigative Power of the Grand Jury in the Constitution of Alaska

"The investigatory, or reporting, power of grand juries refers to the body's ability to issue statements on wide-ranging matters of public policy, generally aimed at exposing "inefficiency, neglect, or criminal or quasi-criminal conduct" by government officials. Grand jurors may propose an investigation themselves or respond to a request from a citizen.

Text, history, and tradition reveal that the grand jury has been understood as an intermediary between the government and the people, empowered to make public statements on the people's behalf and entrusted with assisting the government in doing justice. Since the early days of the Common Law, grand juries had the power to make reports on all matters of public policy, even when it reflected poorly on a specific government official. **Today, whenever the government breaks the direct connection between the grand jury and the people, it violates the historical understanding of what a grand jury is and how it exercises its reporting power.**

The grand jury has its roots in the early medieval period, and its earliest functions were more investigative than indictment-driven. The institution was treated with great respect by both the executive and the judiciary (though it should be noted that the separation of powers was murkier in that period than in the American context).

The American colonists continued the practice of petitioning the government through the grand jurors. For example, in the colony of Virginia, "[i]t appears to have been a common practice for grand juries gathered at the capital to express their opinions on things in general, and on the administration of the royal governor in particular." The grand jurors spoke "as a respectable collection of the people of the county," whose "authority is founded . . . on use and . . . public convenience."

More and more states relied primarily on information instead of indictment, and few made constitutional provision for the investigative power of the grand jury. **But Alaska did make such provision**: "The power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended." With this text, Alaska hearkened back to the fuller understanding of grand juror as neighbor-intermediary—not merely a rubber stamp or a tool in the political process, but a representative of the community with a unique power to petition for change.

At the Alaska constitutional convention, the provision about the investigative function of the grand jury was suggested by Delegate Barr: "The new amendment does not make any mention of the investigating

powers of the grand jury, and I have been told they would still have those powers under the Federal Constitution, but I believe it should be mentioned in our constitution because I think that is one of the most important duties of the grand jury."

Delegate Ralph Rivers tried to explain away the concern by saying that the investigative function's goal is only to "investigate public offices and institutions, not just to investigate anything involving the public welfare" (which he thought was the status quo in the territory). But Delegate Barr doubled down. The grand jury would "investigate and make recommendations concerning things that endangered [the] public welfare's safety, and . . . that is what the grand jury is for[:] to protect the rights of its citizens." Delegate Hellenthal came to his aid, embracing an "extremely broad" investigatory power for the grand jury. In fact, federal grand juries seated in Alaska issued "extremely broad" reports during the very same period that the convention was taking place. Delegate Hellenthal seems to have been correct about the scope of the federal right when he said, "I think **a grand jury can investigate anything."** And not only did they have a right, but according to the territorial law, it was their duty to investigate and report. These reports were usually made public, including in a high-profile incident involving the Ketchikan Police Department only two years before the constitutional convention. [In 1954, a Ketchikan grand jury investigated police corruption in connection with prostitution and returned **a famous report that led to the indictments of the Chief of Police and the United States Attorney in Ketchikan.** See 1986 Alaska Law Review: "THE REPORTORIAL POWER OF THE ALASKA GRAND JURY"]

One of the [Missouri] delegates, Judge Stevens, articulated a very specific mischief to be cured by the provision: "You don't particularly need a grand jury to file information or indictments anymore against individuals who commit crimes, because the . . . Attorney General can do that, **but you need to maintain the grand jury to curb the corrupt act[s] of officials."**

CONCLUSION The Alaska Constitution, correctly interpreted, would seem to protect the right of the grand jury to use its reporting power free of government interference in its role as public intermediary, the "official organ of public protest." **Neither the executive nor the courts should be permitted to decide what the people may protest about.** The executive may assist the grand jury by bringing evidence to form the basis for an indictment. The judiciary may assist the grand jury by explaining the law and matters of procedure. **But they may nowhere come between the citizen and the grand juror by screening out petitions.**

The reporting function of the grand jury is an essential tool for holding the government accountable, one that developed in the early days of the Anglo-American legal system. **To preserve its historic function and prevent its suspension through government capture, the grand jury must remain an intermediary: helping the people to speak to the government** and aiding the government in doing justice for the community."

Critical Information About Alaska's Grand Juries

by Matanuska-Susitna Borough Mayor Edna DeVries

"Because I have personally participated in events that led to the deeply divisive conflict now unfolding—and because I possess knowledge that may help ordinary Alaskans understand and safely navigate it—I feel a duty to speak.

In 1985, while serving in the Alaska State Senate, I witnessed firsthand the power—and the limits—of Alaska's grand jury system. A Juneau grand jury called the Legislature into special session to consider impeachment proceedings against Governor William Sheffield. The allegations were serious: that the governor had improperly steered a $10 million state lease to a campaign contributor and then provided false testimony to the grand jury.

After extensive proceedings, the grand jury issued a report concluding that the evidence demonstrated ***"serious abuse of office"*** and that the administration was ***"unfit to fulfill the inherent duties of public office."*** The grand jurors emphasized that their findings were thorough, complete, and in the public interest to be released for open review.

Despite this, the Senate voted 12–8 against impeachment. I was among those who voted in favor. Instead of meaningful accountability, a nonbinding resolution condemning favoritism was passed.

From that moment, I saw clearly how powerful institutions can ***"circle the wagons"*** to shield themselves—even when a body of independent citizens, constitutionally empowered to investigate wrongdoing, has determined that accountability is warranted.

Soon after, a sharply divided Alaska Supreme Court adopted Criminal Rule 6.1. In effect, this rule severely restricted the ability of grand juries to investigate and publicly report on misconduct by public officials. Notably, two of the five justices dissented, warning that the rule was unconstitutional and fundamentally undermined the Alaska Constitution. They wrote that the rule ***"mocks"*** the Constitution's explicit protection of grand jury authority, which states that such powers ***"shall never be suspended."***

In the decades following the adoption of Rule 6.1, grand jury investigations into public corruption have been virtually nonexistent.

That changed in 2022, when citizens in Kenai organized sustained public demonstrations outside their courthouse, calling for a grand jury investigation into allegations that the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct had falsified or misrepresented investigations to shield judicial misconduct. Their persistence ultimately resulted in the convening of a grand jury.

Since then, credible information suggests that there have been coordinated efforts within the judicial system to obstruct or derail that investigation—raising serious concerns and fueling widespread public distrust.

In late 2024, Mayor Peter Micciche and I joined a small group of concerned citizens in respectfully requesting a meeting with the Governor and the Attorney General. Our goal was simple: to present evidence, discuss the situation, and explore solutions. Despite repeated efforts, no meeting was granted.

This lack of engagement from officials sworn to uphold the Constitution is deeply troubling. Combined with my long view of how these issues have developed and intensified over decades, it has compelled me to take action.

That is why I am running for Governor.

If elected, I will pursue a full and transparent accounting of these matters. I will initiate an independent and public investigation conducted by individuals of unquestioned integrity—people in whom the public can place genuine trust.

I will also move immediately to make public the Kenai grand jury's report and recommendations regarding alleged judicial corruption—information that was sealed before Alaskans had the opportunity to review it. The Alaska Constitution is clear: ***"The power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare or safety shall never be suspended."***

I was born on July 12, 1941. I am 84 years old and will soon turn 85. Some may view my age as a limitation. I see it differently. I am not seeking a long political career. I am seeking one term—focused solely on addressing the serious issues facing our state.

At this stage in my life, there is little that intimidates me. But I am deeply concerned about the long-term consequences of a system that appears increasingly unaccountable—one that could affect future generations of Alaskans, including my own children and grandchildren.

That concern is what drives me to speak—and to act."

Kenai Peninsula Borough
Legal Department

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brent Johnson, Assembly President
Members, Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly

THRU: Sean Kelley, Borough Attorney SK

FROM: Todd Sherwood, Deputy Borough Attorney TS

DATE: January 18, 2022

RE: Investigative Grand Juries in Alaska and Citizen-Initiated Grand Juries in Other States - Resolution 2022-004 (Bjorkman, Elam)

You asked us to provide information in response to two questions:

1. Has the investigative and recommendation power of Alaska grand juries been used in the past?

Yes. The "Alaska Grand Jury Handbook – Alaska Court System – May 2019" lists at least 24 different times the process has been used by grand juries throughout the state (or territory) from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s. The information is not presented as an exhaustive list, but it does appear that there has been little use of the process since the early 1990s.

Alaska investigative grand juries have looked into everything from complex crimes and patterns of crime to alleged misconduct in local and state government to jails and traffic safety. Most of the examples given in the 2019 Grand Jury Handbook appeared in an Alaska Judicial Council report in February 1987 entitled: "The Investigative Grand Jury in Alaska".

Probably the most remarkable example of an investigative grand jury in Alaska is one that sat in Juneau for several months in 1985 to investigate matters involving a lease of state offices that then Governor William Sheffield had been involved in. The grand jury report became the impetus for impeachment proceedings against the governor who ultimately was not removed from office. Alaskans and impeachment: The case of Gov. Bill Sheffield (adn.com) ; Alaska's governor may face impeachment for lease award - CSMonitor.com

Excerpts from AG Cox's Rule Change Comments

"In my capacity as Alaska Attorney General, and on behalf of the Department of Law, I submit the following comments regarding the Alaska Supreme Court's consideration of proposed changes to Alaska Criminal Rule 6.1, which of course pertains to the role of the investigative grand jury to investigate matters of public welfare and safety and to issue reports and recommendations. This subject has generated significant public attention and has raised important questions about the investigative grand jury's proper role under the Alaska Constitution, the respective powers of the branches of government, and the administration of justice.

Under current Rule 6.1, there are two different paths by which a matter may be brought forward for possible investigative grand jury review. First, an empaneled grand juror may propose to the prosecuting attorney that the grand jury investigate a matter concerning public welfare or safety. In that setting, the rule directs the prosecuting attorney to evaluate whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the proposed matter falls within the grand jury's authority and is not patently groundless, made for delay or harassment, or otherwise brought in bad faith.

Second, where the request comes not from an empaneled grand juror but from a citizen outside the grand jury, current Rule 6.1 takes a different approach. It provides that the citizen may direct the concern to the Attorney General for consideration and possible review and investigation by a grand jury. The rule and commentary indicate that a citizen has no right to present a matter directly to the grand jury or to obtain a court order requiring a grand jury investigation. In that respect, the current rule places citizen petitions within the Attorney General's complete prosecutorial discretion. It is this feature of the present system, in particular, that has drawn public concern, and those concerns deserve careful consideration.

In light of that controversy, my office has undertaken a comprehensive review of the issues. Most notably, recent scholarship by Professor Richard Garnett and Savannah Shoffner, published in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, provides perhaps the most detailed examination of the text, history, and traditional function of the investigative grand jury.

All of this confirms that the investigative grand jury was originally understood to serve as an intermediary between the people and the government—an institution through which citizens could raise concerns of public importance and through which the community could speak with some authority. **Historically, this reporting function was not dependent on executive branch screening or prosecutorial discretion.**

If the Supreme Court is interested in amending Rule 6.1 to align with this original understanding, I would recommend a simple path to doing so: the Court could adopt a framework in which the investigative grand jury operates completely within the judicial branch, supported by court-appointed counsel, without requiring the involvement of executive branch attorneys. Such an approach would preserve the grand jury's independence while avoiding separation of powers concerns. Such a change may also address some of the public concerns expressed about the current rule.

The Constitution does not grant the judicial branch the authority to compel work of executive branch attorneys as is envisioned by the proposed rule.

Proposed Rule 6.1(b)(3) similarly requires the Attorney General to "appoint independent counsel" when the Attorney General determines a conflict of interest exists. Troublingly, this authority appears to empower the presiding judge to direct the Attorney General to prosecute a matter and to direct the executive branch to take particular action in a case. This is unconstitutional.

The proposed rule contemplates that the judicial branch is the appropriate body to refer a matter to the grand jury, and in that light, it should bear the entire responsibility— and the cost. Such an approach would be consistent with the original understanding of the grand jury's reporting power. **The delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention sought to ensure that the grand jury could issue reports on matters of public concern free from governmental interference or screening.** This original understanding can be honored by returning the responsibility of the grand jury to the judiciary.

The proposed rule deletes language that defines what constitutes a matter that "concerns the public welfare or safety." See Proposed Rule 6.1(a). This problem is particularly acute in a system where the Department of Law would be required to facilitate investigations without the ability to define or screen their scope. Specifically, the proposed rule deletes current subsections (a)(1)–(a)(3) and the existing commentary, which provides examples as to what constitute "concerns of public welfare or safety." The current commentary provides an example of how "systemic issues or an ongoing, recurring issue impacting the public could be within the scope of a grand jury. But purely private matters, such as, for example, an investigation into any individual court case, (whether open or closed)," generally fall outside the grand jury's investigative authority. See current Commentary to Rule 6.1(a).

The Committee's proposed deletions eliminate the analytical framework that guides the grand jury's work. Without precise language, there is no standard for evaluating the threshold question of scope, whether an investigation should be authorized, and under what circumstances the grand jury should issue a report. Under the current rule, for example, criminal defendants may not use the grand jury process to challenge or relitigate criminal convictions after direct appeals and post-conviction litigation. Such action may not be prohibited under the proposed rule. The potential consequences of removing these guardrails include risks of repetitive litigation, undermining finality, and potential infringement on victims' constitutional protections.

Also, the expectations of the assigned attorney—i.e., 12(e) counsel, see above— should be clearly established and should include precise language regarding scope, standards, and any limitations imposed upon the grand jury investigation.

Without clarity on what constitutes a matter of public welfare or safety, the investigative grand jury process has the potential to be weaponized by disgruntled citizens on issues that would be better handled by other agencies or courts. Rules or commentary as to what constitutes a matter that "concerns public welfare or safety" should be maintained.

In the absence of screening authority, this lack of finality would expose grand juries—and the Department if it is involved—to repeated, resource-intensive proceedings over the same matters. For well-established reasons, the law does not permit parties to relitigate the same claim repeatedly. Whether in civil litigation or criminal proceedings, doctrines of finality apply. The doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) bars relitigating claims that have been resolved by final judgment and precludes parties from advancing legal theories or causes of action that could have been raised previously. This doctrine exists to promote finality, conserve judicial resources, and ensure litigation reaches conclusion.

The proposed rule must be modified to limit successive grand jury petitions.

Under current Rule 6.1(e)(2), the grand jury must comply with Criminal Rule 6(s), which requires that all evidence presented to the grand jury must be legally admissible at trial. The proposed rule eliminates this requirement.

By expressly authorizing the presentation of inadmissible evidence to the grand jury without limitation, the proposed rule endorses what the Alaska Supreme Court previously rejected. And while the grand jury's factual findings under the proposed rule must be based on admissible evidence, any meaningful limit to the grand jury's report are, at best, implicit. See Proposed Rule 6(e)(3). Even if the grand jury adopts factual findings based upon admissible evidence, the ultimate report may still be based on hearsay layered upon hearsay—rumor and conjecture—without a mechanism to ensure the evidence was reliable upon its presentment.

The proposed rule should clarify what evidentiary rules are applicable when presentations are made to the grand jury, and what rules are not.

I appreciate the Court's efforts in grappling with this important area of constitutional law that has long eluded a lasting and manageable solution. However, the Court's currently proposed framework—aside from departing from the original understanding of the clause—raises the problems I discuss above as to separation of powers, public welfare and safety, successive petitions, and evidentiary compliance. For those reasons, the court should reconsider the proposed changes to Criminal Rule 6.1. Thank you for taking into consideration these comments. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact my office. Sincerely, Stephen J. Cox Attorney General"

DISCUSSION

The statements and facts above prove AG Cox and Alaska Judicial System are still trying to unconstitutionally cripple citizen rights to investigate and address corruption by government officials.

1. One proposed rule change prohibits grand juries that investigate from also issuing indictments. Yet the 55 Delegates who wrote Alaska's Constitution wrote this, without a single dissent: ***"The power of Grand Juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find indictments in connection therewith, shall never be suspended."*** [AK Constitutional Convention,

December 15, 1955 proposal entitled "Grand Juries, Indictments and Information"] The Delegates stated the reason they didn't put this into the actual Constitution is because it would limit grand juries to **only** investigating and indicting public officers, and they wanted Alaska's grand juries to have **more** power than this. [See Delegate discussions at 1323-1406] How is it possible that eliminating the right of investigative grand juries to indict, in direct violation of Alaska's Constitution, is the centerpiece of the Alaska Judicial System's current *"rule change"* and AG Cox never protests this glaring constitutional violation? AG Cox and the Judicial System are **STILL** ***"circling-the-wagons"*** so corrupt government officials cannot be indicted.

2. AG Cox claims the Supreme Court cannot order DOL attorneys to assist grand juries because this is *"unconstitutional"*. But in the next breath he claims he must obey unconstitutional Supreme Court orders harming ordinary citizens. How can he protest when it protects his DOL but not protest when it unjustly harms citizens? He is obligated, as was his predecessor Treg Taylor, to immediately file a lawsuit protesting the Supreme Court's actions. And he states there must be layer upon layer of government restrictions regulating what and how grand juries investigate (*"separation of powers, public welfare and safety, successive petitions, and evidentiary compliance"*) when the scholarly Harvard investigation he himself commissioned holds the opposite (*"But they [executive and judicial branches] may nowhere come between the citizen and the grand juror by screening out petitions."*)

3. To explain his refusal to meet with concerned Alaskans, AG Cox states *"I do not take many outside meetings with this job."* But, according to Mayor Edna DeVries, this included refusing her and Mayor Peter Micciche when they wished to present evidence that Deputy Attorney General John Skidmore had ordered multiple grand juries to stop investigating (felony jury tampering) evidence that the Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct is falsifying investigations to keep corrupt judges on the bench. How can an Attorney General justify refusing two Mayors asking to discuss evidence of criminal corruption in the very Department he heads? All officials refuse to even consider a public investigation into this. Deputy Attorney General Cori Mills outright stated on tape that neither she, nor the Attorney General have authority to investigate government corruption. If they don't, who does?

4. AG Cox states citizens should be barred from presenting court cases to the grand jury. But neither he nor the Harvard scholars discuss this undisputed statement by the Delegates writing Alaska's Constitution: ***"The Grand Jury in its investigative power as well as for the fact it is sitting there as a panel sometimes is the only recourse for a citizen to get justice, to get redress from abuse in lower courts... it is the only safeguard a citizen occasionally has when for any reason, and very often for political reasons, a case is not dealt with properly."*** (Alaska Constitutional Convention - transcript page 1328) Nor do they discuss this undisputed Delegate statement: ***"The Grand Jury can be appealed to directly, which is an invaluable right to the citizen."*** (Alaska Constitutional Convention - transcript page 1328.)

5. AG Cox claims all evidence Alaska's grand juries see, consider, and use must be approved by the government according to government rules. Yet the United States Supreme Court refutes this:

   Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center (The Library of Congress):

- **Costello v. United States (1956)**: This is the landmark case on the subject. The Court held that a defendant can be required to stand trial even if the indictment was based **solely on hearsay evidence**. The Court reasoned that neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the specific kind of evidence a grand jury must consider.

- **United States v. Calandra (1974)**: The Court reaffirmed the broad investigative powers of the grand jury, noting it should remain ***"unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial."*** This case specifically held that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule (barring **illegally seized evidence) does not apply to grand jury proceedings.**

- **United States v. Williams (1992)**: While primarily about exculpatory evidence, this case reinforced the independence of the grand jury from judicial oversight. The Court held that courts cannot dismiss an indictment simply because the prosecutor failed to present *"substantial exculpatory evidence,"* further limiting the ability of defendants to challenge the quality of evidence used to secure an indictment.

   Why would AG Cox want to impose not required evidence rules the government gets to make and enforce against grand juries? To make sure grand juries can't investigate government corruption.

6. AG Cox states: *"The Alaska Constitution vests legislative power with the legislature, executive power in the governor, and judicial power in the courts. One branch of government may not encroach upon or exercise the powers of another branch. The doctrine "limits the authority of each branch to interfere in the powers that have been delegated to the other branches" with the purpose to "preclude the exercise of arbitrary power and to safeguard the independence of each branch of government.""* What AG Cox has conveniently forgotten (Alaska's Judicial System also) is that the Alaska Constitution vests the people's power in the grand jury - so no other branch may encroach upon its powers. As much as they may desire to do so in order to prevent being investigated, indicted, and reported on.

7. For Alaska's grand juries to work as intended by Alaska's Constitution and by the Delegate who wrote it, the grand jury must be free to make its own decisions on what and how to investigate (including what concerns the public welfare or safety – in opposition AG Cox's claim *"Rules or commentary as to what constitutes a matter that 'concerns public welfare or safety' should be maintained."*), on what evidence suffices for either an indictment or report, and that citizens must be able to have unqualified access to appealing directly to the grand jury.

8. The judicial system, as it now stands, allows judges, prosecutors, law enforcement, and private attorneys to falsify evidence, testimony, and rules in any manner they wish, secure in the knowledge they will never be investigated by anyone other than themselves. This allows them to take what they wish from innocent citizens without repercussion: children; permanent fund dividends; freedom; property; and/or life-savings. In effect Alaskan citizens are slaves and forced to bow to court judgements that on the surface appear legitimate but in fact are nothing more than fraud.

CONCLUSION

Proof of the stunning effectiveness in Rule 6.1 unconstitutionally stopping grand jury investigations is KPBA attorney Sean Kelley's *"Memorandum"*. It documents that for the first 30 years after Alaska became a state, grand jury investigations into government corruption were common: *"but it does appear that there has been little use of the [grand jury investigation] process since the early 1990's."*

Rule 6.1 was implemented in 1989.

And when it was passed two of the five Supreme Court Justices claimed it would unconstitutionally restrict grand juries from operating as they should – stating Rule 6.1 ***"mocks"*** Alaska's Constitution. These two Supreme Court Justices, at the very outset, knew grand jury investigations would suffer. And suffer they did, causing incalculable damage to Alaska's citizens for over 3 decades.

Unless Rule 6.1 is rescinded entirely I believe there will eventually be a civil war, fought with real guns, real people, and real blood – all to restore constitutional rights clearly given to We-The-People to investigate and address corruption in our government officials.

We Alaskans – nay – We Americans: We bow to no one.

Most Sincerely,

David Haeg
(907) 398-6403 phone/text
haeg@alaska.net

PS: Because this battle will only be won with sheer numbers of informed citizens, I humbly ask this document be forwarded and published everywhere possible – and that everyone email or text their name and email address to either haeg@alaska.net or (907) 398-6403. In addition, We-The-People are planning a peaceful sit-in at noon on December 11, 2026 (just after new Governor is sworn in) in the Robert B. Atwood Building in Anchorage, Alaska. We plan on free hot-dogs, soda, and possibly cotton-candy!